Orbe v. True
No. 03-4, 2003 WL 22920337, at *1
(4th Cir. Dec. 11, 2003) by unknown
Capital Defense Journal
Volume 16 | Issue 2 Article 7
Spring 3-1-2004
Orbe v. True No. 03-4, 2003 WL 22920337, at *1
(4th Cir. Dec. 11, 2003)
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Casenote, U.S. Fourth Circuit is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Capital Defense Journal by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University School
of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Orbe v. True No. 03-4, 2003 WL 22920337, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 11, 2003), 16 Cap. DEF J. 465 (2004).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlucdj/vol16/iss2/7
Orbe v. True
No. 03-4, 2003 WL 22920337, at *1
(4th Cir. Dec. 11, 2003)
L Faas
Dennis Mitchell Orbe ("Orbe") was convicted of capital murder and
sentenced to death for robbing and killing a convenience store clerk in York
County, Virginia.' On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia upheld
Orbe's death sentence.2 Orbe unsuccessfully sought certiorari fromthe United
States Supreme Court.' After the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed his state
habeas petition, Orbe filed a petition for federal habeas relief in May of 2002.'
The district court dismissed Orbe's habeas petition and declined to grant him a
certificate of appealability ("COA").'
Upon application to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, Orbe was granted a COA for five habeas claims.6 The Fourth Circuit
certified the following claims: (1) whether the prosecutor improperlyconsidered
Orbe's race in deciding to seek a death sentence ("Race Cai"); (2) whether the
court improperly excused a potential juror ("Juror Cairn"); (3) whether Orbe's
trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to act properlyin response
to the prosecutor's unfair race considerations ("IAC Race Cairn"); (4) whether
Orbe's trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance for "failing to challenge the
exclusion of the venireman" ("IAC Juror Claim"); and (5) whether defense
counsel's failure to investigate adequatelyand present mitigating evidence consti-
tuted ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC Mitigation Claim").7
1. Orbe v. True, No. 03-4, 2003 WL 22920337, at *1 (4th CAr. Dec. 11, 2003) (per curiam)
(opinion not selected for publication). For a more complete discussion of the facts surrounding the
crime, seegrray Robert H Robinson, Jr., Case Note, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 261 (1999) (analyzing Orbe
v. Commonwealth, 519 S.E.2d 808 (Va. 1999)).
2. Or, 2003 WL 22920337, at *3 (citing 04A 519 SE.2d at 810).
3. Orbe v. Virginia, 529 U.S. 1113 (2000) (mem.).
4. Wr, 2003 WL 22920337, at *3; se 28 U.S.C 5 2254 (2000) (discussing the procedures
for review of habeas corpus petitions in federal court; part of AEDPA). See rally Orbe v. True,
233 F. Supp. 2d 749 (ED. Va. 2002) [hereinafter Oiv III (dismissing Orbe's federal habeas
petition).





The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Orbe's habeas
petition and rejected each of the five claims for which it had granted a COA8s
The court found that Orbe failed to show cause for procedurally defaulting the
Race and Juror Claims and to demonstrate that his trial counsel was constitution-
ally ineffective as alleged in the IAC Race, Juror, and Mitigation Claims.9 In
addition, the Fourth Circuit declined to decide whether defendants may use
ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC') claims as cause to excuse the procedural
default of the underlying substantive claims.'
III. A mtywis
A. Rae andriJwur (lam
Orbe argued that the prosecutor's decision to seek the death penalty was
race based. 1 As support, Orbe relied on an alleged statement made by the
prosecuting attomeyto Orbe's defense counsel in which the prosecutor indicated
her unwillingness to agree to a plea that would result in a life sentence. 2 The
prosecutor stated that she recently had sought a death sentence against an
African American man and believed that she should not treat Orbe, who is white,
any differently.3 Orbe raised this claim for the first time on state habeas review
before the Supreme Court of Virginia.14 Orbe also raised his second claim, that
the trial court improperly excluded a potential juror, for the first time in his state
habeas proceeding.'" According to Orbe, the trial court improperly dismissed
Velma Conner ("Conner") from jury service based on her answers during death
qualification questioning. 6
In accordance with the rule announced in S/ajtnm v Pamiro-'7 the Supreme
Court of Virginia ruled that both the Race Claim and the Juror Claim were
procedurally barred because Orbe failed to raise them at trial or on direct
appeal." The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court's determination that
8. Id
9. Id at *4, *16.
10. Id at '5.
11. Obe, 2003 WL 22920337, at *6.
12. Id
13. Id
14. Id at *3.
15. Id
16. Id at *8. The trial court dismissed Conner because she "consistently expressed uncer-
taintyin her ability to act as an unbiased juror capable of imposing the death penalty if Orbe were
convicted of capital murder." Id
17. 205 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1974).
18. OWi, 2003 WL 22920337, at *3; seSlayton v. Parrigan, 205 S..2d 680, 682 (Va. 1974)
[Vol. 16:2
ORBE V. TRUE
Orbe had "procedurally defaulted federal habeas review" of those claims by
failing to raise them in his direct appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia.19 The
Fourth Circuit considered whether Orbe had adequately shown" 'cause for the
default and actual prejudice' or 'that failure to consider the claims will result in
a fundamental miscarriage of justice.' "20 Orbe presented evidence of defense
counsel's ineffective assistance to establish "cause" for the procedural default of
the Race and Juror Caims.2" The Fourth Circuit noted that Orbe was essentially
relying on his IAC Race and IAC Juror Claims to excuse the procedural default
of his Race and Juror Claims.22 Because the state habeas court had adjudicated
Orbe's IAC Race and IAC Juror Claims on the merits, 28 U.S.C S 2254(d) (1)
mandated that a federal habeas court apply a deferential standard of review to
those claims." However, Orbe argued that the IAC claims deserve de novo
review when offered as "cause" for procedural default.24 The Fourth Circuit
declined to decide whether IAC claims that establish "cause" for the procedural
default of underlying substantive claims should receive deferential or de novo
review. 2' Instead, the court based its decision to dismiss the Race and Juror
Claims on its finding that Orbe had failed to establish "cause" because he did not• ' " 26
prove that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective.
B. InffaiwAssistau f md Clams
Orbe argued that defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to: (1) use the prosecutor's improper consideration of race to the benefit of the
defense; (2) object to the exclusion of venireman Conner, and (3) investigate
Orbe's background adequatelyand present mitigating evidence at the sentencing
phase of his trial.27 In denying Orbe's IAC Race Claim, the Fourth Circuit stated
that Orbe's defense counsel did not believe that the prosecutor's decision was
(stating the rule that claims that could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, but were not, are
procedurally defaulted).
19. G, 2003 WL 22920337, at *4.
20. Id (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991)).
21. Id
22. Id
23. Id at*5;se28 U.S.C 2254(d)(1) (2000) (preventing federalhabeas relief unless the state
court's adjudication"'was conuayto, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"; part of AEDPA).
24. C&, e, 2003 WL 22920337, at *5; sw O'b II, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 757 (addressing the
defendant's argument "that the cause-for-default ineffective assistance determination is reviewable
by a federal court de mm).
25. Div 2003 WL 22920337, at *5; see discussion bou Part IV.A (discussing whether IAC
claims that establish cause for procedural default deserve deferential or de novo review).
26. C&, 2003 WL 22920337, at *5.
27. Id at *3.
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racially motivated and that they were not "constitutionally ineffective for failing
to raise a selective prosecution claim on appeal or for failing to exploit the
prosecutor's mere mention of Orbe's race during the conversation."28 Similarly,
the court found that Orbe failed to establish that defense counsel's decision not
to object to the dismissal of Conner constituted ineffective assistance.29 The
Fourth Circuit stated that "a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assis-
tance" and the decision not to object "might be considered sound trial
strategy. 3  Finally, the court rejected Orbe's claim that the failure to investigate
properly and present mitigation evidence was sufficient to establish ineffective
assistance.31 Pursuant to the test set forth in Stri&landv Washingta 32 the Fourth
Circuit determined that counsel's performance was reasonable and that, even if
it was deficient, the defense was not prejudiced because additional evidence
would have been repetitive." Therefore, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision to deny Orbe's IAC claims.34
IV. Application m Vngnz
A. IrfatiteA ssistax as "Czuse"forPr ral Defadt
Orbe's IAC Race and Juror Claims were adjudicated on the merits by the
Supreme Court of Virginia in the state habeas proceeding.35 The Fourth Circuit
noted that it was precluded from granting federal habeas relief for these claims
unless the state court's adjudication "'was contraryto, or involved an unreason-
able application of, clearlyestablished Federal law, as determined bythe Supreme
28. Id at *7.
29. Id at *10.
30. Id (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)).
31. Id at *15-*16. In particular, Orbe claimed that defense counsel-"
(1) failed to adequately inves ate and present to the jury Orbe's history of sexual,
physical and emotional a buse;(2) failed to obtain and present additional miti*atin
evidence from family and fri ens regarding this abuse, his troubled childhoo, an
his struggles with mental illness and-depressor (3) failed to present evidence that
Orbe probably suffered from Bipolar Disorder instead of or in addition to evidence
of his depression and suicidal thoughts- and (4) tailed to obtain mental health records
that woild have demonstrated that 6 rbe was suicidal and had sought in-patient
treatment eight months prior to the murder.
Id at *11.
32. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
33. Cqxa 2003 WL 22920337, at *14-*16; see Stricklar 466 U.S. at 688 (stating that to prove
ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show "that counsel's representation fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness" and that counsel's conduct prejudiced the outcome of the
proceeding).
34. C&, 2003 WL 22920337, at *16.
35. Id at "5.
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Court of the United States' or 'resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.' "36
The district court properly applied this deferential standard of review to the IAC
Race and Juror Caims." By offering these claims as "cause" to excuse default
of the substantive Race and Juror Caims, Orbe sought to have the Fourth
Circuit review his IAC claims de novo rather than apply the deferential review
required by28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1).3' Thus, Orbe attempted to use the same facts
of ineffective assistance in two different ways: "First, he relie[d] on them as
cause to excuse the default of the underlying substantive claims .. and second,
he assert[ed] that they are independent grounds for relief in their own right."39
The Fourth Circuit was presented with the question of whether a federal court
should applyde novo or deferential reviewto IAC claims offered as "cause" for
procedural default.4" Although the court chose to dismiss the substantive claims
on the grounds that Orbe failed to show that counsel was ineffective, and
therefore failed to show "cause," the standard of review issue is still relevant."
In Orbe's case, the district court stated that "it is logical that the same
degree of deference must be accorded to prior state adjudications of ineffective
assistance claims, regardless of the procedural posture of the ineffective assis-
tance claims on federal habeas." 2 Yet, if federal courts apply deferential review
to "cause" determinations, there is the risk that a "procedurallydefaulted federal
constitutional claim" might never be heard on the merits in any court. 3 In
Murray u Crrier" the Supreme Court stated that the question of "cause" is "a
question of federal law."4" The Court echoed this statement in Jcmon v Missis-
si0pz' by announcing that" 'the question of when and how defaults in compli-
ance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a federal
question is itself a federal question.' ",4 Along these lines, the Fourth Circuit
noted that "at least one other district court has ... [held] that procedural default
remains an independent federal doctrine and, accordingly, that we determine de
36. Id (quoting 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1) (2000)).
37. Id
38. Id
39. OirfI, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 757.
40. G&, 2003 WL 22920337, at *5.
41. Id
42. OieII, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 759.
43. C&, 2003 WL 22920337, at *5.
44. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
45. Murrayv. Cartier, 477 US. 478, 489 (1986).
46. 486 US. 578 (1988).




novo whether a state court defendant has demonstrated cause to excuse his or
her failure to raise a constitutional claim before the state courts. 48
Attorneys should be aware that the Fourth Circuit has not taken a definitive
stance on whether it will use deferential or de novo review for "cause" determi-
nations. If the court uses deferential review, the petitioner must prove that the
state court's adjudication of the claims offered as "cause" was "contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearlyestablished Federal law."'49 If the
court applies de novo review, petitioners simply need to prove "cause" as they
would an independent basis for relief. De novo review is clearly preferable in
that it does not restrict the petitioner's abilityto establish cause persuasively. In
addition, de novo review effectively allows petitioners a second chance to prove
IAC by permitting another court to take a fresh look at the IAC claims.
B. Mitintibnlmestigion
The Fourth Circuit held that despite defense counsel's incomplete investiga-
tion, the defense was not prejudiced."0 The court's decision was based on its
belief that additional mitigation evidence would have been repetitive of evidence
alreadypresentedto the jury."' However, in death penaltycases, defense counsel
is required by Wigs v SnitI 2 "to undertake reasonable investigations into
possible mitigating evidence that could be presented during the penaltyphase."53
Regardless of whether such evidence was cumulative, defense counsel clearlyhad
a dutyat least to procure Orbe's mental health records. Thus, although counsel's
overall mitigation investigation was extensive, the lack of these records showthat
the investigation was incomplete. Attorneys should be aware that death penalty
cases require "reasonable investigations" and that they should perform all
reasonable investigations regardless of whether they plan to use the materials
during the sentencing phase.
48. O/ , 2003 W 22920337, at *5. C(2m Holloway v. Horn, 161 F. Supp. 2d 452, 478
n.12 (ED. Pa. 2001), andHolland v. Horn, 150 F. Supp. 2d 706,747 (E.D. Pa. 2001), uid, oir, 233
F. Supp. 2d at 760 (concluding that "Orbe's ineffective assistance claims asserted as cause to excuse
default were decided on the merits . . . and thus must be reviewed deferentially pursuant to
2254(d)").
49. Se28 U.S.C S 2254(d)(1) (2000) (discussing when a federal habeas court maygrant relief;
part of AEDPA).
50. 0h, 2003 WL 22920337, at *15.
51. Id
52. 123 S. C. 2527 (2003).
53. Wiggins v. Smith, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535-36 (2003); Nw, 2003 W. 22920337, at *12.
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C Exdwin cf Vemmmn CrmEr
The trial court dismissed Conner because it found that she "could not stand
without bias or partiality" based on her answers during the qualification phase. 4
Although the Fourth Circuit disagreed with Orbe that his trial counsel's failure
to object to the dismissal constituted ineffective assistance, the court recognized
the significance of counsel's inaction."5 The court stated that, "[w]ere we adjudi-
cating the merits of a claim that the trial court improperly dismissed Venireman
Conner over defense counsel's unsuccessful objection, our task would be a more
difficult one." 6 The Fourth Circuit observed that "it [was] not unquestionably
apparent that Venireman Conner's responses demonstrated that her'views would
prevent or substantially impair the performance of h[er] duties as a juror.'
This acknowledgment signifies the importance of objecting to the exclusion of
jurors whose impartiality is at issue. Had Orbe's counsel objected at the time
that Conner was excused, Orbe would have had a much stronger claim that the
dismissal was improper, especiallyconsidering that the record does not unambig-
uously convey juror bias. In addition, Orbe's trial counsel should have argued
that Conner's responses indicated her suitability as a juror. In particular, she
stated that "[tihe evidence would have to be very strong" in order for her to
impose the death penalty.8 This remark shows that Conner would have been a
good juror precisely because the Commonwealth has the burden to prove a
defendant's death eligibility beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, We makes clear
that capital defense attorneys should object to the exclusion of potential life
jurors.
V. Cmdxion
Defense counsel should be aware of the three main issues discussed in this
case note. First, defense counsel should note that the Fourth Circuit has not
definitivelystated whether ineffective assistance as "cause" for procedural default
receives deferential or de novo review. Second, defense counsel in a capital case
have an obligation to perform a thorough investigation, such as obtaining mental
health records, regardless of any intent to use the materials as mitigation evi-
dence. Third, defense counsel should be aware that a failure to object to the
exclusion of a potential juror will make it difficult for the defendant to claim that
the juror was improperly dismissed on appeal.
54. C k 2003 WL 22920337, at -9.
55. Id
56. Id
57. Id (quoting Wainwright v. Wirt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985)).




At 9:13 p.m. on Wednesday, March 31, 2004, Dennis Mitchell Orbe was
executed at the Greensville Correctional Center.9 In last-minute appeals, Orbe's
defense counsel argued that Virginia's method of lethal injection constituted cruel
and unusual punishment. 0 The United States Supreme Court denied these
appeals, and Governor Mark Warner declined to delay Orbe's execution.61
Jessie A. Seiden
59. Man WhoKilla Va Cieik Exeaed byLatdul eo, ROANOKE TIMES, Apr. 1, 2004, at
Va. 3.
60. Id
61. Id
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